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re you a domestic terrorist if your ideology drives you to 
destroy a medical facility?  The answer is yes, provided 
the facility is one that performs animal experiments and not 
abortions.  If your mission compels multiple murders of abortion 
providers, you are merely a criminal, albeit a particularly 
dangerous one.  If your victims are vivisectionists, however, you 
are labeled a terrorist.  You need not even commit the murders.  
Placing your victims in reasonable fear of serious injury will 
qualify as terrorism. 
Confused?  Uneasy?  Uncertainty about the eventual scope of 
enforcement of the recently enacted Animal Enterprise 
Terrorism Act (“AETA”)1 has made some nonviolent animal 
rights advocates feel the same way.2  Opponents of abortion 
 
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2008.  Associate Editor, 
Oregon Law Review, 2007–08.  I would like to thank my wife, Ellen, for her 
invaluable support and inspiration and Professors Garrett Epps, Rebekah Hanley, 
and Robert Illig for their critical guidance and advice. 
1 Pub. L. No. 109-374, 120 Stat. 2652 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 43 
(2006)). 
2 See Vince Patton, Fur Store Owner:  Terror Charges for Activists, KGW.COM, 
Nov. 29, 2006, http://www.kgw.com/news-local/stories/kgw_112806_news 
_schumacher_terrorists.33a8771c.html (“What [AETA] is certainly doing is putting 
a chill on the animal advocacy movement because nobody knows exactly where the 
line is.” (quoting Laura Ireland Moore, Director, Animal Law Center, 
Northwestern School of Law of Lewis & Clark College)). 
A 
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rights felt similarly unnerved after the 1994 enactment of the 
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act3 (“FACE”).4  But 
because AETA brands militant animal protectionists as 
terrorists, mainstream animal rights supporters fear the graver 
consequences that accompany that despicable label.5 
In many ways, AETA parallels FACE.  AETA and FACE 
have similar statutory wording and address similar criminal 
conduct.  AETA lawmakers appear to have borrowed some of 
FACE’s clauses to avoid impinging on protesters’ First 
Amendment rights.  Indeed, both laws prompt some of the same 
constitutional concerns. 
Despite these concerns, federal courts have broadly upheld 
FACE.6  Assuming AETA also is upheld, a result that seems 
likely for reasons this Comment will discuss, AETA’s application 
of the politically charged terrorism label will continue to impose 
a greater chilling effect on animal rights advocates than FACE 
places on abortion opponents. 
AETA’s use of the terrorism label potentially is harmful in 
several ways.  First, characterizing aggressive animal activists as 
terrorists may hamper the pursuit of genuine terrorists by 
confusing them with those who commit ordinary property 
 
3 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2006). 
4 See, e.g., FACE:  Challenges Accrue, Totalling 7; Rescues Planned, ABORTION 
REP., June 10, 1994 (citing statement of Beverly LaHaye, President, Concerned 
Women of America, that FACE will have a “chilling effect on peaceful protest”). 
5 See generally PHILLIP HERBST, TALKING TERRORISM:  A DICTIONARY OF THE 
LOADED LANGUAGE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 164 (2003) (“Conveying 
criminality, illegitimacy, and even madness, the application of terrorist shuts the 
door to discussion about the stigmatized group . . . while reinforcing the 
righteousness of the labelers, justifying their agendas and mobilizing their 
responses.”).  For a discussion of the importance and difficulty of distinguishing 
terrorism from legitimate political violence, see John Alan Cohan, Necessity, 
Political Violence, and Terrorism, 35 STETSON L. REV. 903 (2006). 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Bird, 401 F.3d 633, 634 (5th Cir. 2005); Norton v. 
Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 
1073 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 256 (3rd Cir. 2000); 
United States v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Weslin, 
156 F.3d 292, 294 (2d Cir. 1998); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 589 (4th Cir. 1997); 
Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 
1519 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Heather J. Blum-Redlich, Annotation, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act 
(FACE) (18 USCS § 248), 134 A.L.R. FED. 507 (1996) (describing cases upholding 
FACE against constitutional challenges). 
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crimes.7  Second, a definition of terrorism that punishes those 
who destroy civilian property while excluding those who murder 
civilians is perverse.  Third, such a definition imposes fear that 
chills politically unpopular protest against the enterprises that 
AETA purports to protect.  The thousands of terrorism 
investigations pursued since September 11, 2001–or almost any 
image of Guantanomo Bay “detainees”–suggests that such a 
fear is rational.8  Finally, reducing protest removes an incentive 
that can prompt enterprises to recognize the business value of 
making improvements in areas of social concern.  While reducing 
protest and its associated burdens of decreased sales and 
increased public relations costs may have potential short-term 
benefits, this Comment suggests that delaying improvements in 
areas of social concern ultimately may weaken competitiveness. 
Part I of this Comment provides a background on AETA from 
its origins in the bioresearch industry to its adoption as law.  Part 
II compares the crimes of militant animal protectionists with those 
of militant abortion opponents.  Part III then compares AETA 
and FACE, analyzing AETA’s constitutionality using as a model 
decisions upholding FACE.  Part III concludes that AETA does 
not violate the First Amendment.  Part IV argues that since 
AETA is likely to withstand First Amendment scrutiny, the law 
legitimizes an inconsistent use of the terrorism label that will 
hinder protected protest activity.  Finally, Part V suggests 
reasons that this chilling effect is not benign,9 including societal 
consequences of constraining protest and economic 
consequences for protested enterprises. 
 
 
7 See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-03-519T, COMBATING TERRORISM:  
OBSERVATIONS ON NATIONAL STRATEGIES RELATED TO TERRORISM 7 (2003) 
[hereinafter GAO, COMBATING TERRORISM] (statement of Richard J. Decker, 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, explaining risks of duplicated 
efforts and misallocation of resources from multiple definitions of terrorism). 
8 “[F]ederal investigators have interviewed more than 15,000 ‘persons of interest’ 
in connection with activities investigators associate with terrorism” since September 
11, 2001.  Allen Pusey, Every Terrorism Case Since 9/11, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2007, at 16 
(citing a Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse of Syracuse University 
analysis of Justice Department data).  These investigations have led to more than 
4300 prosecutions and almost 3000 convictions.  Id.  The average sentence has been 
twenty-seven months.  Id. 
9 See generally Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment:  
Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685 (1978). 
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I 
BACKGROUND ON THE ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM ACT 
President Bush signed AETA on November 27, 2006.10  
Members and trade groups of the agricultural, fashion, and 
pharmaceutical industries immediately cheered what they saw as 
the accomplishment of a mission:11  to “create[] penalties for 
persons encouraging, financing, assisting or engaged in acts of 
animal and ecological terrorism.”12 
Also having reason to celebrate were other “animal 
enterprises.”13  AETA defines this term broadly, including 
business interests ranging from breeders and circuses to pet 
stores, rodeos, and zoos.14  The term covers any “commercial or 
academic enterprise that uses or sells animals or animal products 
for profit, food or fiber production, agriculture, education, 
research, or testing.”15  AETA gives these interests powerful 
enforcement tools by significantly expanding the scope of conduct 
criminalized under its predecessor statute, the 1992 Animal 
Enterprise Protection Act (“AEPA”).16 
Despite existing laws prohibiting generally the same 
conduct–including AEPA, which specifically addressed 
violence against animal enterprises17–AETA’s proponents 
 
10 Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, President Signs S. 
435, S. 819, S. 1131, S. 2462, and S. 3880 (Nov. 27, 2006), http://www.whitehouse 
.gov/news/releases/2006/11/20061127-1.html. 
11 See, e.g., Fur Comm’n USA, Mission Accomplished!  AETA Passes Both 
Houses!, http://www.furcommission.com/resource/Resources/AETA.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2007) (listing industry groups supporting AETA). 
12 Press Release, Am. Legis. Exch. Council, ALEC Offers Legislation to Fight 
Domestic Terror by Animal and Eco-Extremist Groups (Sept. 15, 2003) 
[hereinafter ALEC Press Release], http://www.alec.org/news/press-releases/press-
releases-2003/september/alec-offers-legislation-to-fight-domestic-terror-by-animal-
rights-and-eco-extremist-groups.html. 
13 See, e.g., Statement of Norman Abrams, Acting Chancellor, Univ. of Cal., L.A., 
A Message from the Chancellor on Animal Research Legislation (Nov. 2006), 
http://www.ucla.edu/chancellor/statement-researchlaw.html. 
14 18 U.S.C. § 43(d)(1)(B) (2006). 
15 § 43(d)(1)(A). 
16 18 U.S.C. § 43 (1992) (amended 2006). 
17 AEPA originated with the National Association for Biomedical Research.  The 
law created the crime of “animal enterprise terrorism,” defined as “intentionally 
stealing, damaging or causing the loss of, any property (including animals or 
records) used by the animal enterprise . . . or conspir[ing] to do so.”  § 43(a)(2) 
(1992) (amended 2006). 
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argued that a gap in the law allowed underground militant 
activists to “exploit current law’s inadequacy of addressing and 
protecting non-primary targets.”18  Some prosecutors, however, 
argue that convictions of “eco-terrorists” need not require “an 
exotic anti-terror law.”19  Indeed, prosecutors have used existing 
criminal laws to obtain convictions of animal rights activists on 
arson, burglary, conspiracy, theft, and trespass charges20 arising 
from conduct that AETA now regulates as terrorism.21 
Notwithstanding prosecutorial successes, law enforcement 
against militant animal rights protectionists has not been without 
challenges.  Militant animal rights activists often work 
independently and lack hierarchical organizations, making 
surveillance difficult.22  Consider the Animal Liberation Front 
(“ALF”).  The group, which the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
considers most representative of the threat from domestic 
 
18 Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act:  Hearing on H.R. 4239 Before the Subcomm. 
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 29 (2006) (statement of William Trundley, Vice President, Global Corporate 
Security and Investigations, GlaxoSmithKline). 
19 E.g., Joshua K. Marquis & Danielle M. Weiss, Eco-Terror:  Special Interest 
Terrorism, PROSECUTOR, Jan.-Feb. 2005, at 30, 35. 
20 See, e.g., State v. Troen, 786 P.2d 751 (1990); Eco-Terrorism and Lawlessness 
on the National Forests:  Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Forests and 
Forest Health of the H. Comm. on Resources, 107th Cong. 52 (2002) [hereinafter 
Eco-Terrorism and Lawlessness Hearing] (statement of James F. Jarboe, Domestic 
Terrorism Section Chief, Counterterrorism Division, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation) (noting successful prosecutions of “individuals alleged to have 
perpetrated acts of eco-terrorism” on arson and extortion charges).  Major incidents 
of animal rights or eco-extremism declined in 2004, effectively deterred by existing 
criminal laws.  Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United States:  
Hearing Before the Select S. Comm. on Intelligence, 108th Cong. 26 (2005) 
[hereinafter National Security Threats Hearing] (statement of Robert S. Mueller III, 
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
21 The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon has held that the terrorism 
enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines § 3A1.4 could apply to defendants 
convicted of conspiracy to commit arson and destruction of an energy facility.  
United States v. Thurston, No. CR 06-60069-01-AA, 2007 WL 1500176, at *20 (D. 
Or. May 21, 2007).  The court emphasized that “the definition of ‘federal crime of 
terrorism’ explicitly requires an intent ‘to influence or affect the conduct of 
government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government 
conduct.’”  Id. at *15.  The court appeared to recognize effects of the terrorist label 
beyond those on the defendants’ sentences, noting that “[t]he issue the court must 
decide is not whether the defendants are ‘terrorists’ as the word commonly is used 
and understood in today’s political and cultural climate.”  Id. at *1. 
22 See Eco-Terrorism and Lawlessness Hearing, supra note 20, at 53. 
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terrorism directed toward animal enterprises,23 has no apparent 
organization; anyone committing a “direct action” that serves 
ALF’s published goals may claim credit in its name.24  
Describing the proposed legislation, AETA’s drafters expressed 
the frustration of many law enforcement professionals with the 
prosecutorial challenges that the autonomy of ALF activists 
presents:  the group’s “lack of membership rules would make the 
cells seemingly easy to penetrate by undercover law enforcement 
agencies.  However, it’s [sic] non-hierarchical structure and lack 
of membership rosters rather effectively thwart gathering usable 
evidence.”25 
These law enforcement challenges offered AETA’s 
conservative drafters an opportunity to promote the model bill as 
addressing what they viewed as existing law’s greatest 
shortcoming:  the government’s inability to reach the assets of 
legitimate nonviolent animal rights groups such as People for the 
Ethical Treatment of Animals (“PETA”).  AETA’s drafters 
accused PETA of conspiring with and supporting ALF through 
financial contributions and statements of support in principle for 
criminal conduct directed toward animal enterprises.26  The 
drafters also cited the development of “ALF splinter group” 
Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (“SHAC”) as another 
justification for a new law.27  New Jersey and California courts 
have upheld injunctive relief against SHAC on accusations that 
the group, like PETA, conspired with violent activists by 
publishing information on their actions.28 
 
23 See id. 
24 Andrew N. Ireland Moore, Caging Animal Advocates’ Political Freedoms:  The 
Unconstitutionality of the Animal and Ecological Terrorism Act, 11 ANIMAL L. 255 
(2005). 
25 AM. LEGIS. EXCH. COUNCIL, ANIMAL & ECOLOGICAL TERRORISM IN 
AMERICA 9 (2003) [hereinafter ALEC REPORT], available at http://www.alec.org/ 
meSWFiles/pdf/AnimalandEcologicalTerrorisminAmerica.pdf. 
26 Id. at 8; cf. Randy Borum & Chuck Tilby, Anarchist Direct Actions:  A 
Challenge for Law Enforcement, in 28 STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 201, 
220 (2005) (discussing similar challenges for law enforcement in investigating 
decentralized political revolutionary groups). 
27 ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 8.  “Huntingdon” refers to Huntingdon Life 
Sciences, a United Kingdom-based “pharmaceutical company that tests drugs on 
animals.”  Id. 
28 See generally Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon 
Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2006); TEVA 
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AETA is a legislative byproduct of the American Legislative 
Exchange Council (“ALEC”), a collaborative of industry 
representatives and legislators formed during the early Reagan 
administration to advance conservative policies by developing 
and introducing model legislation.29  In building support for the 
model bill that became AETA, ALEC suggested a need to 
protect animal-using industries from groups such as PETA and 
SHAC,30 which often release documentary evidence obtained 
during break-ins.31  Exposing the treatment of animals inside 
animal enterprises such as vivisection facilities and factory farms 
can have significant economic effects on such enterprises.  For 
example, a 1993 DOJ report noted “in the fur industry, the 
impact of an attack on local public opinion can translate into the 
gradual and potentially permanent loss of clientele.”32  SHAC 
has claimed that negative public opinion generated by its 
campaigns led at least thirty-four companies to end business 
relationships with animal testing provider Huntingdon Life 
Sciences.33 
To protect its industry members from these economic threats, 
ALEC proposed to “jail[] and penalize[] animal and eco-
terrorists and their sympathetic financial agents for what they 
are–domestic terrorists.”34  AETA accomplishes this goal by 
imposing graduated penalties tiered to “economic damage” on 
anyone who “travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . . for the 
purpose of damaging or interfering with the operations of an 
animal enterprise.”35  This language roughly parallels AEPA, 
enacted in 1992.  Unlike AEPA, however, AETA criminalizes 
intentionally placing a person in reasonable fear of death or 
serious bodily injury,36 or conspiring or attempting to do so for 
 
Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 2005 
WL 1010454 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005). 
29 Am. Legis. Exch. Council, Background About ALEC, http://www.alec 
.org/about (last visited Jan. 11, 2007). 
30 See ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 7, 8. 
31 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE EXTENT AND 
EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM ON ANIMAL 
ENTERPRISES 7 (1993) [hereinafter DOJ REPORT]. 
32 Id. at 22. 
33 Borum & Tilby, supra note 26, at 214. 
34 ALEC Press Release, supra note 12. 
35 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(1) (2006). 
36 § 43(a)(2)(B). 
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the purpose of damaging or interfering with animal enterprise 
operations.37  AETA thus widens the scope of conduct subject to 
classification under the label of terrorism.  In broadening the 
reach of that inflammatory term, the new law risks chilling 
protected protest activity. 
II 
SPECIAL-INTEREST EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM 
A.  Defining Terrorism 
The definition of terrorism shares with its practitioners an 
uncanny ability to elude pursuit.  The concept of terrorism has 
persisted throughout history,38 but resists capture in a universal 
definition despite the efforts of sociologists, theologists, 
philosophers, psychologists, and lawmakers.  As Emanuel Gross, 
Haifa University Professor of Criminal Law and a former Israeli 
military court judge, explains, no definitive agreement on “which 
circumstances, if any, would denude a particular act of its terrorist 
attributes” exists.39  Here and abroad, debate over the elements 
of terrorism continues.40 
At least twenty-two definitions or descriptions of “terrorism” 
and terms relating to support of terrorism occur in U.S. federal 
law.41  The analytical vagueness is important for two reasons.  
First, because terrorist acts and ordinary criminal acts consume 
different law enforcement resources, it is important to avoid 
misidentifying one as the other, even though terrorism may 
encompass criminal acts.42  Second, denomination of a violent act 
as an act of terrorism carries significant individual and societal 
 
37 § 43(a)(2)(C). 
38 EMANUEL GROSS, THE STRUGGLE OF DEMOCRACY AGAINST TERRORISM 
11 (2006). 
39 Id. at 11–12. 
40 Id. at 12–16 (comparing terrorism statutes in the United States, Britain, and 
Israel). 
41 See Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism:  
The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249, 255 n.48 (2004) (citing 
numerous statutory definitions).  “[T]he search for a single definition has come to 
resemble the quest for the holy grail.”  Id. at 249 n.2 (quoting OMAR MALIK, 
ENOUGH OF THE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM xvii (2000)). 
42 GROSS, supra note 38, at 13. 
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consequences.43  As this Comment will show, characterization of 
violent activism as terrorism is likely to repress willingness to 
engage in nonviolent protest for those causes.  Confrontational 
protest activities, such as those of radical environmentalists, 
antiglobalization advocates, and abortion opponents, may be 
vulnerable to characterization as acts of domestic terrorism,44 
placing protected speech in these areas at risk under sweeping 
definitions. 
Shaping a definition for various applications, such as for 
criminal or diplomatic contexts, is not necessarily an unworkable 
practice.  The extremely malleable meanings given to terrorism, 
however, promote inefficient use of law enforcement resources,45 
as well as the criticism that the United States fails to act 
consistently toward those it accuses of terrorism.46 
Moreover, the various definitions create the danger of 
improperly attaching a pejorative and politically powerful label.  
As Nancy Chang, Senior Litigation Attorney at the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, cautioned after passage of the USA 
PATRIOT Act, “protest activities that previously would most 
likely have ended in a charge of disorderly conduct under a local 
ordinance can now lead to federal prosecution and conviction 
for terrorism.”47  A RAND Corporation chronology of incidents 
of international terrorism since 1968 highlights the potential for 
political misuse of the label, noting that definitions of terrorism 
appear viewpoint dependant.48  A report on the RAND 
compilation concluded that the terrorist label condemns both 
politically and socially because it “implies a moral judgment; and 
if one party can successfully attach the label . . . to its opponent, 
then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral 
viewpoint.”49 
 
43 See HERBST, supra note 5, at 163 (“Carrying enormous emotional freight, [the 
label of] terrorism is often used to define reality in order to place one’s own group 
on a high moral plane, condemn the enemy, rally members around a cause, silence 
or shape policy debate, and achieve a wide variety of agendas.”). 
44 NANCY CHANG & CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SILENCING 
POLITICAL DISSENT 45 (2002). 
45 See GAO, COMBATING TERRORISM, supra note 7, at 7. 
46 Perry, supra note 41, at 270. 
47 CHANG ET AL., supra note 44, at 113. 
48 BRIAN MICHAEL JENKINS, THE STUDY OF TERRORISM:  DEFINITIONAL 
PROBLEMS 1 (1980). 
49 Id. 
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A comparative study of definitions used in the United States, 
Britain, and Israel revealed the common factors as ideological 
motivation and the use of acts that provoke various degrees of 
fear among all or part of the public.50  These two elements are 
found in the FBI’s definition, which describes terrorism as 
including “unlawful use of force and violence against persons or 
property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian 
population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives.”51  The U.S. Department of State adopted the 
definition given in 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2), identifying terrorism 
as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or 
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.”52  
The Patriot Act sets out the legal standard, limiting domestic 
terrorism to activities that: 
(A) [I]nvolve acts dangerous to human life that are a violation 
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State; 
(B) appear to be intended–(i) to intimidate or coerce a 
civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government 
by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a 
government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; 
and 
(C) occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.
53
 
In contrast, AETA criminalizes the conduct of anyone who: 
(A) [I]ntentionally damages or causes the loss of any real or 
personal property (including animals or records) used by an 
animal enterprise, or any real or personal property of a person 
or entity having a connection to, relationship with, or 
transactions with an animal enterprise; 
(B) intentionally places a person in reasonable fear of the 
death of, or serious bodily injury to that person, a member of 
the immediate family . . . of that person, or a spouse or 
intimate partner of that person by a course of conduct 
 
50 See GROSS, supra note 38, at 16. 
51 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2007). 
52 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL 
TERRORISM 2001 xvi (2001) (footnote omitted), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/10286.pdf. 
53 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5) (2006) (emphasis added); see also Ethan Carson Eddy, 
Privatizing the Patriot Act:  The Criminalization of Environmental and Animal 
Protectionists as Terrorists, 22 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 261, 273–74 (2005). 
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involving threats, acts of vandalism, property damage, criminal 
trespass, harassment, or intimidation; or 
(C) conspires or attempts to do so.
54
 
Although AETA amended AEPA by substituting the term 
“Terrorism” for “Protection,” AETA’s definition of terrorism 
differs in two significant ways from that of the Patriot Act.  First, 
AETA includes in its definition of terrorism acts of less 
magnitude than the Patriot Act requires.  Second, AETA 
outlaws conduct without reference to political objective. 
In AETA’s case, the elimination of a political motivation 
element from the bill’s original draft ensured passage.  ALEC’s 
model bill applied to any “animal or ecological terrorist 
organization or any person acting on its behalf or at its request or 
for its benefit or any individual whose intent to commit the 
activity was {optional language insert ‘politically motivated’}.”55  
The revised bill omitted any content-based language referring to 
political motivation.  That result apparently addressed the First 
Amendment concerns of most legislators,56 as well as the 
American Civil Liberties Union,57 which dropped its 
opposition.58 
Deletion of political purpose as an element of the offense 
allows AETA to avoid attack as a form of unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination, as Part III discusses.  The “optional” 
language in the model bill’s text, however, indicates that political 
motivation may have been merely a red herring designed to 
allow proponents to strike an obviously unconstitutional 
provision without affecting the bill’s actual scope.  The 
 
54 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). 
55 ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 22. 
56 But see 152 Cong. Rec. H8590, 8594 (statement of Rep. Kucinich contending 
that “what we have done here is we have crippled free expression”). 
57 Id. (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner noting that while the ACLU “ask[ed] for 
minor changes, . . . they did not express one concern about constitutionally 
protected first amendment rights being infringed upon or jeopardized in any way by 
this bill”). 
58 Letter from Caroline Fredrickson, Director, Washington Legislative Office, 
ACLU, to F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, House Judiciary Committee (Oct. 
30, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/general/asset_upload_file809 
_27356.pdf (“The ACLU does not oppose [AETA], but believes that . . . minor 
changes are necessary to make the bill less likely to chill or threaten freedom of 
speech. . . . While the ACLU does not condone violence or threats, we are 
concerned when a law singles out a specific group that engages in expressive 
activity.”). 
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increased likelihood that AETA will pass constitutional muster 
gives this deviation from the Patriot Act’s definition of 
terrorism greater potential to chill protected speech. 
Animal rights activists may be less likely to engage in 
nonviolent protest against enterprises that allegedly exploit 
animals for profit if the activists fear that indirectly attacking 
those enterprises or expressing support for direct attacks may be 
characterized as terrorism.  Ironically, by deleting the political 
motivation requirement to avoid threatening protected speech, 
legislators enhanced the law’s ability to hinder constitutionally 
protected conduct that cannot be condemned plausibly as 
terrorism. 
B.  Animal Rights-Influenced Violence 
A fundamental aspect of the animal rights movement is moral 
philosophy.59  A number of philosophical theories contend for 
support within and around the movement.60  This diversity of 
perspectives extends to considerations of the morality of violent 
acts in defense of animals.61  For the most part, however, major 
scholarly works articulating tenets of the animal rights 
movement share a disavowal of violence aimed at safeguarding 
animals and insist instead on nonviolence.62 
 
59 See GARY L. FRANCIONE, RAIN WITHOUT THUNDER:  THE IDEOLOGY OF 
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 12 (1996). 
60 Id. 
61 Compare MARK ROWLANDS, ANIMALS LIKE US 188 (2002) (“You cannot be 
violent to a table.  You can be violent with a table–as when you hit somebody over 
the head with it–but your violence is then directed against the person and not the 
table.  In any reasonable sense of the term, you can be violent only against things 
that can suffer.”) with TOM REGAN, EMPTY CAGES:  FACING THE CHALLENGE OF 
ANIMAL RIGHTS 188 (2004) (“Someone who sets fire to an empty abortion clinic or 
torches a vacant synagogue causes no physical injury to any sentient being, but to 
suppose that those acts of arson are nonviolent distorts what violence means.”). 
62 See, e.g., Gary L. Francione, Abolition of Animal Exploitation:  The Journey 
Will Not Begin While We Are Walking Backwards, ABOLITIONIST-ONLINE, 
http://www.abolitionist-online.com/article-issue05_gary.francione_abolition 
.of.animal.exploitation.2006.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 2007) (“Not only is violence 
problematic as a moral matter, it is unsound as a practical strategy.”); Jeff Perz, 
Exclusive Non-Violent Action:  Its Absolute Necessity for Building a Genuine 
Animal Rights Movement, ABOLITIONIST-ONLINE, http://www.abolitionist-
online.com/article-issue05_exclusive.non.violent.jeff-perz.shtml (last visited Jan. 11, 
2007); REGAN, supra note 61, at 191 (“[U]ntil [animal rights advocates] have done 
the demanding nonviolent work that needs to be done, the use of violence, in my 
judgment, is not morally justified. . . . It is also a tactical disaster.”). 
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Militant activists appear to share with some animal rights 
philosophers a moral compass pointing toward acceptance of 
property destruction as nonviolent action because it is not 
directed against beings that can suffer.  ALF, for example, 
“carries out direct action against animal abuse in the form of 
rescuing animals and causing financial loss to animal 
exploiters.”63  Those who act in the group’s name64 use violence 
against property “to save as many animals as possible and 
directly disrupt the practice of animal abuse.65  ALF’s credo, 
however, mandates “a nonviolent campaign, activists taking all 
precautions not to harm any animal (human or otherwise).”66  
Thus, while ALF has been described as “one of the most active 
extremist elements in the United States”67 and “the most 
dangerous of domestic terror threats,”68 the group’s philosophy 
and precautions have prevented the loss of any human life during 
any of its “direct actions.”69  These usually involve vandalism, 
theft, or release of animals.70  ALF’s tactics have less frequently 
included arson and “the occasional use of explosive devices.”71 
Although large-scale property destruction is only a small part 
of animal rights extremism, such destruction still induces fear.  
Industry groups estimate that damages from acts of major 
vandalism since 1993 exceed $45 million.72  In that sense, militant 
animal protectionism certainly merits definition as intimidation.  
Even so, it falls outside the Patriot Act definition of domestic 
terrorism.  Militant activists target particular enterprises, not 
 
63 Animal Liberation Front, The ALF Credo and Guidelines, 
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/alf_credo.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 
2007) [hereinafter ALF Credo]. 
64 “Whether ALF in the United States can be characterized as an organization . . . 
or as an ‘umbrella’ ideology or cause, is an issue still being debated.”  DOJ 
REPORT, supra note 31, at 6. 
65 ALF Credo, supra note 63. 
66 Id. 
67 Eco-Terrorism and Lawlessness Hearing, supra note 20, at 50. 
68 ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 22. 
69 DOJ REPORT, supra note 31, at 16. 
70 Id. at 15 (categorizing 76 percent of incidents attributed to animal rights 
extremists between 1977 and 1993 as minor property damage or theft/release of 
animals). 
71 National Security Threats Hearing, supra note 20, at 26. 
72 See Eco-Terrorism and Lawlessness Hearing, supra note 20, at 50 (citing 
estimates of Fur Commission and National Association for Biomedical Research). 
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civilian populations.  Militant activists’ activities have not 
involved taking human lives, although they have included threats 
and harassment.73 
AETA’s enactment, however, suggests that the terrorism 
label adheres equally to vandals in empty research labs and 
hijackers in fully loaded passenger planes, a consequence that 
seems absurd.  At the same time, a distinction based on the use of 
force against human beings poses another problem.  Violence 
against another human being does not inevitably make the 
aggressor a terrorist.  Battery is not a terrorist act.  If mass 
destruction, assassination, or kidnapping are prerequisites for the 
terrorist label,74 then that designation should not also apply to 
trespassers and thieves, even if their actions result in significant 
property damage.  Further, if the definition of terrorism includes 
coercion of a civilian population,75 it is difficult to argue that 
property destruction, without more, should qualify.  One cannot 
coerce property; hence, force directed against property, or the 
fear that destruction of property may invoke, must be 
sufficiently extreme before application of the terrorist label 
becomes reasonable.76 
Under AETA, however, punishment for “animal enterprise 
terrorism” is possible even if the offense results in no economic 
damage or bodily injury.77  Use of the law against an act that 
implicates neither of the two most common components of a 
terrorism definition–violence and political purpose78–would 
expand the legal meaning of terrorism dramatically.  As 
Professor Mark Rowlands, applying a terrorism definition 
similar to that used by the FBI,79 notes, “[a]t most, only a tiny 
 
73 See, e.g., Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty 
USA, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 531–33 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005). 
74 18 U.S.C. § 2331(5)(B) (2006). 
75 § 2331(5)(B)(i). 
76 See ROWLANDS, supra note 61, at 189. 
77 § 43 (b)(1)–(1)(A) (specifying punishment of fine or imprisonment “under this 
title . . . if the offense does not instill in another the reasonable fear of serious 
bodily injury or death and . . . results in no economic damage or bodily injury”). 
78 See Perry, supra note 41, at 251 (citing ALEX P. SCHMID, POLITICAL 
TERRORISM:  A RESEARCH GUIDE TO CONCEPTS, THEORIES, DATA BASES, AND 
LITERATURE 119–52 (1983) (cataloging elements of over 109 terrorism 
definitions)). 
79 The FBI applies the definition of terrorism found in 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2007). 
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fraction of extreme animal rights action qualifies as terrorism.”80  
Thus, the breadth of AETA’s definition of terrorism is 
questionable, especially since, as AETA’s drafters noted, “the 
federal definition of terrorism requires the death of or harm to 
people, an element not characteristic of eco-terrorists.”81  
Moreover, given the divergent treatment of abortion opponents 
under FACE, discussed below, AETA’s application of the 
terrorism label to criminal trespass or acts of simple vandalism is 
unjustifiable. 
C.  Antiabortion-Influenced Violence 
The crimes against abortion clinics, providers, and staff 
carried out at the height of the antiabortion movement surpass 
in severity and frequency even those of the most militant 
balaclava-wearing animal rights extremist.82  FBI data for 1977 to 
1993 document the following incidents of violence attributed to 
animal rights extremists:  one assassination attempt;83 twenty-nine 
threats against individuals; fourteen firebombings; twenty-one 
arson attacks; sixteen bomb threats; nine bomb hoaxes; twenty-
six incidents of major property damage; 160 incidents of 
vandalism; and seventy-seven thefts or animal releases.84  In 
contrast, antiabortion extremists committed at least one murder; 
three attempted murders; two kidnappings; seventy-two butyric 
acid attacks; eighty-eight incidents of assault and battery; 
twenty-eight bombings; 113 arson attacks; sixty-one attempted 
bombings or arson attacks; and 543 incidents of vandalism 
 
80 ROWLANDS, supra note 61, at 193. 
81 ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 15. 
82 See Eco-Terrorism and Lawlessness Hearing, supra note 20, at 50 (“Despite the 
destructive aspects of [the Animal Liberation Front’s] operations, [it] . . . 
discourages acts that harm ‘any animal, human and nonhuman’ . . . [and has] 
generally adhered to this mandate.”). 
83 DOJ REPORT, supra note 31, at 16.  The report provides no information on the 
subject of the alleged attempt.  It emphasizes, however, that “there is no evidence 
to indicate that firearms were used during the course of any of the documented 
incidents in the United States.”  Id. at 15. 
84 Id. at 15–16.  The report presents data on 313 incidents over a 16-year period.  
The report does not include “demonstrations, sit-ins, and other protests,” and notes 
that because the types of conduct documented “often overlap in any given incident, 
total of the activities would far exceed the incident total and therefore is not 
stated.”  Id. at 15. 
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during this period.85  In addition, antiabortion extremists issued 
166 death threats.86  An additional murder of a clinic owner and 
abortion provider may have been abortion related.87  In total, 
instances of antiabortion-driven violence outnumbered incidents 
of animal rights-driven violence three to one.  Table 1 compares 
the frequency of these crimes. 
 
TABLE 1 
COMPARISON OF ANIMAL RIGHTS AND ABORTION EXTREMIST 
VIOLENCE 1977–199388 
 
 Animal Rights 
Extremists 
Antiabortion 
Extremists 
ACTIONS AGAINST PEOPLE   
Murders  1 
Attempted Murders 1 3 
Kidnappings  2 
Butyric Acid Attacks  72 
Assault and Battery Incidents  88 
Threats 29 166 
 
ACTIONS AGAINST PROPERTY 
  
Bombings 14 28 
Arson Attacks 21 113 
Attempted Bombing or Arson  61 
Major Property Damage  26  
Minor Property Damage 160 543 
Thefts 77  
Bomb Hoaxes 9  
Kidnappings  2 
Total Incidents 337 1079 
 
85 NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, NAF VIOLENCE AND DISRUPTION STATISTICS:  
INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE & DISRUPTION AGAINST ABORTION PROVIDERS IN THE 
U.S. & CANADA, available at http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/ 
downloads/about_abortion/violence_statistics.pdf. 
86 Id. 
87 Police categorized a second murder of a clinic owner and abortion provider as 
a bungled robbery.  PATRICIA BAIRD-WINDLE & ELEANOR J. BADER, TARGETS 
OF HATRED:  ANTI-ABORTION TERRORISM 352 (2001). 
88 These statistics reflect DOJ and National Abortion Federation data.  See supra 
notes 83–85 and accompanying text. 
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The annual number of murders of abortion providers peaked 
at four in 1994, when FACE was enacted.89  The year 1994 also 
saw eight attempted murders, fifteen successful or attempted 
bombings or arson attacks, eight acid attacks, and fifty-nine 
death threats.90  Yet, under FACE, this conduct was not defined 
as terrorism.  FBI Director William H. Webster refused to 
categorize the violence as terrorism because its intent was not to 
shift or overthrow the government but rather to further a social 
objective.91  When leaders of the pro-choice movement heavily 
criticized Webster’s statements as clinic violence intensified, he 
eventually allowed that if the terrorism label were applied “in a 
semantical term, I’m not going to quarrel with it.”92  FACE’s 
title, however, remained neutral, like that of AEPA, AETA’s 
predecessor. 
While animal rights extremists have continued to use violent 
tactics since 1993, they have not taken lives.  AETA’s creators, 
however, presented their model legislation as necessary to 
protect against a threat comparable to that of al-Qaeda.93  
Despite the FBI’s acknowledgment of the effective deterrence 
that successful prosecutions under existing criminal laws had 
achieved,94 ALEC posited a rising–and deadly–“wave of 
domestic terrorism”95 attributable to animal rights and 
environmental extremists: 
 Notably, it has been a matter of ALF doctrine that no 
person may be killed or seriously injured in the pursuit of 
fulfilling a mission.  However, this principle seems to be largely 
ignored by the highly extreme wings of the organization.  As 
former ALF spokesman Kevin Jonas said, “When push comes 
to shove, we’re ready to push, kick, shove, bite, do whatever to 
win.”
96
 
 
 
89 See NAT’L ABORTION FED’N, supra note 85. 
90 Id. 
91 Blasts Not on F.B.I. Terrorism List, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1984, at A23. 
92 Ed Magnuson, Explosions over Abortion, TIME, Jan. 14, 1985, at 16 
(highlighting that “[o]ne focus of controversy has been the FBI’s reluctance to label 
[clinic] bombings as terrorist acts”). 
93 See ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 9. 
94 National Security Threats Hearing, supra note 20, at 26. 
95 ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 4. 
96 Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
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ALEC went on to speculate that the most extreme elements 
of militant special-interest activist groups “might splinter off and 
start escalating the violence of their attacks.  If their voice isn’t 
heard by burning buildings, perhaps it may be heard by cutting 
throats.”97 
While militant animal rights protectionists likely will continue 
destroying property to cause economic harm, they are unlikely 
to begin using deadly violence like that occurring at the height of 
antiabortion extremism.  Hence, the application of the terrorism 
label to animal rights extremists is inconsistent at best.  If AETA 
withstands constitutional scrutiny, a result that seems probable, 
Congress should amend AETA to restore its original title and 
remove the terrorist label.  Alternatively, Congress might 
consider changing FACE’s title to the “Freedom from Abortion 
Clinic Terrorism Act.”  Terrorism’s definitional malleability 
promotes politicization of the term, as the RAND report cited in 
Part I suggests.98  The terrorism label is “politically loaded,” 
attachable at political will to “political extremists, common 
criminals, and authentic lunatics.”99  The label defies removal.100  
Thus, if, as ALEC suggested in promoting its model bill, criminal 
law should “call a terrorist, a ‘terrorist,’”101 lawmakers and courts 
should take care that it does so consistently. 
III 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Abortion opponents wasted no time in contesting FACE’s 
constitutionality.102  Despite a barrage of legal challenges, 
however, each of the nine U.S. Courts of Appeals that has 
considered a FACE case on constitutional grounds has upheld it, 
and the Supreme Court to date has refused to consider cases 
 
97 Id. at 11 (positing rising trend of future violence by members of Earth 
Liberation Front); cf. id. at 9 (predicting that violence of ALF actions will also 
increase). 
98 See JENKINS, supra note 48, at 2. 
99 Id. at 9–10. 
100 Id. at 2 (“[T]errorism can mean just what those who use the term . . . want it to 
mean–almost any violent act by an opponent.”). 
101 ALEC Press Release, supra note 12. 
102 Regina R. Campbell, Comment, “FACE”ing the Facts:  Does the Freedom of 
Access to Clinic Entrances Act Violate Freedom of Speech?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 
964 (1996). 
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challenging FACE.103  Since FACE and AETA implicate largely 
the same constitutional concerns, FACE provides a useful 
predictor for future AETA challenges.  This Part compares the 
two statutes against the body of FACE case law. 
A.  Commerce Clause Analysis 
Like FACE, AETA draws its regulatory authority from the 
Commerce Clause.104  Thus, it is important to examine briefly 
AETA’s vulnerability to a Commerce Clause challenge.  FACE 
has survived several Commerce Clause attacks105 and the 
Supreme Court has shown no willingness to alter what appears to 
be the general agreement that FACE is a proper exercise of the 
commerce power.106 
One example of that apparent consensus is Hoffman v. Hunt, 
in which the Fourth Circuit found that FACE regulates activity–
the blocking of clinic entrances–that is connected closely to 
interstate commerce.107  Accordingly, the court held that 
Congress had authority under the Commerce Clause to enact 
FACE.108  The Fourth Circuit earlier had upheld FACE against a 
similar challenge in American Life League, Inc. v. Reno.109 
Reexamining its reasoning in light of the Supreme Court’s 
decision to narrow the scope of Congress’s commerce power in 
United States v. Lopez,110 the Fourth Circuit in Hoffman again 
found that the provision of reproductive health care services 
 
103 United States v. Bird, 401 F.3d 633, 634 (5th Cir. 2005); Norton v. Ashcroft, 
298 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1073 (8th 
Cir. 2000); United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 256 (3rd Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Wilson, 154 F.3d 658, 660 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Weslin, 156 F.3d 292, 
294 (2d Cir. 1998); Hoffman v. Hunt, 126 F.3d 575, 589 (4th Cir. 1997); Terry v. 
Reno, 101 F.3d 1412, 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1519 
(11th Cir. 1995).  The Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in each case. 
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2006). 
105 Blum-Redlich, supra note 6, at 507. 
106 See Norton v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003) (denying petition for certiorari); 
see also Nicole Huberfeld, Be Not Afraid of Change:  Time to Eliminate the 
Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 243, 284–85 (2004) 
(discussing reasoning in line of cases upholding FACE under the Commerce 
Clause). 
107 126 F.3d 575, 579 (4th Cir. 1997). 
108 Id. at 588. 
109 47 F.3d 642 (4th Cir. 1995). 
110 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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substantially affects interstate commerce.111  Unlike the 
connection to commerce of handguns in schools, which the 
Supreme Court in Lopez found insufficient to support the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990,112 the obstruction of clinic 
entrances could provide “a rational basis for Congress to 
conclude ‘that the regulated activity affects interstate 
commerce.’”113  Women travel across state lines seeking 
reproductive health services.  Medical supplies also move 
through interstate commerce.114  Thus, the court found sufficient 
authority under the commerce power for Congress to enact 
FACE.115 
Similar reasoning should support AETA against a Commerce 
Clause challenge, although the commerce connection is less 
apparent.  Professor John Nagle notes that “[i]t is easier to make 
the link between abortion clinics and interstate commerce than   
. . . between abortion protesters and interstate commerce.”116  
Similarly, the relationship between the Commerce Clause and the 
activity of animal rights activists is more obscure than that 
between the Commerce Clause and the activity of animal 
enterprises.117  AETA prohibits using interstate commerce to 
damage the property of any animal enterprise or anyone 
connected with an animal enterprise.  Thus, like FACE, AETA 
addresses a “typically interstate activity by regulating typically 
intrastate actors.”118  Offenses under AETA committed solely by 
intrastate actors would appear beyond reach.  Criminalizing 
conspiracy to commit any of AETA’s enumerated offenses119 
helps AETA avoid such a narrowing construction. 
Moreover, the prevalence of electronic communications in 
modern activism affords AETA another nexus with interstate 
 
111 Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 588. 
112 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–63. 
113 Hoffman, 126 F.3d at 583 (quoting Am. Life League, Inc., 47 F.3d at 647). 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 588. 
116 John Copeland Nagle, The Commerce Clause Meets the Delhi Sands Flower-
Loving Fly, 97 MICH. L. REV. 174, 210 (1998) (emphasis added). 
117 Cf. United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 692 (7th Cir. 1995) (Coffey, J., 
dissenting) (“[FACE] applies to the activity of the demonstrators, not to the activity 
of the clinic itself.  A federal statute that thus regulates purely non-commercial 
activity, while at the same time absent jurisdictional language, is unprecedented.”). 
118 Nagle, supra note 116, at 210 (emphasis added). 
119 18 U.S.C. § 43(a)(2)(C) (2006). 
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commerce.  The Internet and e-mail are essentially instruments 
of interstate commerce.120  Activists’ use of these and other 
communication tools for organizing, publicizing, or expressing 
support for violent actions easily could bring them within 
AETA’s reach.121 
B.  First Amendment Analysis:  Content-Neutrality 
Just as our society enshrines free expression as the 
“transcendent value” that the Supreme Court first recognized in 
Speiser v. Randall,122 our First Amendment jurisprudence 
establishes content-neutrality as the beacon of freedom of 
speech analysis.  Even those whose speech is not threatened may 
be heard to declare against content-based restrictions.123  Indeed, 
the distinction between content-based and content-neutral 
restrictions determines nearly every modern free speech case.124 
The distinction turns on whether the government’s regulation 
of certain speech stems from its disagreement with the message 
of that speech.125  Disagreement with the speech’s subject matter 
or the speaker’s point of view is a presumptively invalid basis for 
restricting freedom of expression.126  A statute challenged as a 
content-based regulation therefore provides the starting point for 
analysis and determines the appropriate level of scrutiny. 
 
120 See Kiera Meehan, Note, Installation of Internet Filters in Public Libraries:  
Protection of Children and Staff vs. the First Amendment, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 483, 
490 (2003) (“The Internet (like railways and highways) is by its very nature an 
instrument of interstate commerce.”). 
121 See, e.g., Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty 
USA, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005) (“[C]ertain 
entries SHAC USA published on its Internet Web site constituted a ‘credible threat 
of violence.’”); United States v. Mathison, Crim. No. 95-085-FVS (E.D. Wash. 
1995). 
122 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958). 
123 See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Because of the sensitive 
nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of 
those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their rights.  For free 
expression–of transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercising 
their rights–might be the loser.”). 
124 Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of 
Speech:  Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 53 
(2000). 
125 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 719 (2000) (citing Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)). 
126 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992). 
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1.  FACE’s Incidental Effect on Protected Expression 
FACE does not apply directly to speech.127  Even so, a statute 
that regulates only conduct that the First Amendment does not 
protect may affect some conduct with protected elements.128  
Thus, in Norton v. Ashcroft, the most recent published appellate 
opinion to have examined FACE under the First Amendment,129 
the Sixth Circuit began with an assessment of content-neutrality. 
In Norton, antiabortion activists sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief after federal agents advised them that picketing, 
praying, and counseling on the sidewalk outside an abortion 
clinic put them at risk of violating FACE.130  The court upheld 
FACE as content neutral despite the implication that FACE 
impinged protected expression.131  FACE, the court explained, 
proscribes interference with access to reproductive health 
services regardless of the reason.132  The court cited the 
prosecution under FACE of a pro-choice protester who made a 
threatening phone call to “an anti-abortion facility” as an 
example of the law’s indifference to content.133  Further, the court 
suggested that clinic workers on strike might face prosecution 
under FACE if they blocked clinic entrances, despite protesting 
for reasons entirely unrelated to abortion.134 
The Norton court also found it irrelevant that antiabortion 
protesters faced greater frequency of prosecution under FACE 
than did those demonstrating for choice.135  In support of this 
proposition, the Norton court cited the Seventh Circuit case 
United States v. Soderna in which the court reasoned that 
 
127 Norton v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 547, 552 (6th Cir. 2002). 
128 Id. 
129 In the most recent federal case to examine FACE at the circuit court level, the 
Fifth Circuit vacated a decision finding FACE unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause.  See United States v. Bird, 401 F.3d 633, 634 (5th Cir. 2005). 
130 Norton, 298 F.3d at 551. 
131 Id. at 553. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. (citing United States v. Mathison, Crim. No. 95-085-FVS (E.D. Wash. 
1995)) (Daniel Adam Mathison was charged with one count of violating FACE and 
one count of making an unlawful interstate communication after he allegedly called 
a pregnancy-support service and told the operator that he had a gun and intended 
to shoot abortion protestors outside clinics.  Man Indicted for Anti-Abortion 
Threats, OREGONIAN, Apr. 13, 1995, at F6.). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
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antiabortion protesters are more likely to face prosecution 
because “it is mainly they who are interfering with the provision 
of pregnancy-related services, just as it was Vietnam War 
protesters who burned their draft cards.”136 
Like those Vietnam-era activists, modern protesters using 
violent forms of expression face the question of whether their 
conduct equals speech.137  Conduct that does not communicate 
does not receive heightened scrutiny.138  The court in Norton, 
however, did not need to apply the test set out in Spence v. 
Washington139 to determine whether the conduct prohibited 
under FACE–force, threat of force, or physical obstruction140–
was communicative.  Neither actual or threatened force nor 
obstruction had occurred.141  Rather, the court recognized that 
FACE affected the nonverbal conduct of “peaceful but 
unobtrusive picketing.”142  It considered FACE under the 
intermediate scrutiny appropriate to content-neutral regulations 
of communicative conduct,143 applying the four-part test 
articulated in United States v. O’Brien.144  Under O’Brien, which 
applies to conduct that is intended to convey a particularized 
message and likely to do so, the Sixth Circuit first found that 
FACE furthered an important governmental interest unrelated 
to suppression of free expression:  safeguarding access to 
reproductive health services.145  Next, the court concluded that 
FACE ameliorated any incidental hindrance of expressive 
conduct146 by expressly excluding protected speech and leaving 
ample alternative channels for communication.147  Perceiving no 
greater restriction on First Amendment freedoms than 
 
136 82 F.3d 1370, 1376 (7th Cir. 1996). 
137 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402–06 (1989). 
138 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968). 
139 See 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974). 
140 18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (2006). 
141 Norton v. United States, 298 F.3d 547, 551–52 (6th Cir. 2002). 
142 Id. at 552. 
143 Id. at 553. 
144 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
145 Norton, 298 F.3d at 553. 
146 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1) (2006). 
147 Norton, 298 F.3d at 553. 
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necessary, the court found that FACE satisfied O’Brien’s 
requirements.148 
2.  AETA’s Content-Neutrality 
Like FACE, AETA’s regulation appears content neutral 
because it excludes viewpoint-based discrimination against 
protected protest activities.149  AETA prohibits two broad 
categories of action.  First, it proscribes property-based conduct 
intended to damage or interfere with animal enterprises, 
including causing the loss of property, animals, or records used 
by those enterprises or the people or entities connected to 
them.150  Second, AETA addresses personal attacks, including 
the intentional placement of another person in reasonable fear of 
death or serious injury.151 
As the Supreme Court noted in NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co.,152 the Constitution affords violence no protection 
whether or not the violent actor intends by his conduct to express 
a message.153  Thus, while AETA’s second proscribed category, 
assault, “is not by any stretch of the imagination expressive 
conduct protected by the First Amendment,” as the Court 
described assault in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, AETA’s first category 
of prohibited action, regarding property-based conduct, 
potentially could support a statutory interpretation that includes 
protected conduct. 154 
Damage of another person’s property, of course, is clearly 
outside the First Amendment’s protection, even if one 
demonstrates by that conduct intent to convey a particularized 
message.  The status of AETA’s purpose element appears 
somewhat less certain.  A violator must intend to “damag[e] or 
interfer[e] with the operations of an animal enterprise.”155  
AETA leaves “interfere with” undefined, but AETA’s offense 
element, which shadows the purpose provision, prohibits 
 
148 Id. 
149 §§ 43(e)(2), 248(d)(2). 
150 § 43(a)(1)–(2)(A). 
151 § 43(a)(2)(B). 
152 458 U.S. 886 (1982). 
153 Id. at 916. 
154 508 U.S. 476, 484 (1993). 
155 § 43(a)(1). 
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“damag[ing] or caus[ing] the loss of” an enterprise’s property.156  
AETA bridges these provisions by defining the offense as 
prohibited conduct done “in connection with” the requisite 
purpose.157  Thus, an actor would appear to violate AETA if, “in 
connection with” the “purpose of damaging” an animal 
enterprise, he or she “intentionally damage[d]” the property of 
that enterprise.  As AETA’s purpose element captures both 
“damaging” and “interfering with,” it therefore seems plausible 
that the conduct described in my previous sentence would 
trigger AETA’s penalties equally if “interfere with” replaces 
“damage.”  Applying such a statutory construction would subject 
an actor to prosecution under AETA if, “in connection with” the 
“purpose of . . . interfering with” an animal enterprise, he or she 
“intentionally [interfered with]” the property of that enterprise. 
As Part II.B. explained, militant animal protectionists 
attempt, at minimum, to accomplish exactly that sort of 
interference.  They intend violent conduct to convey 
unambiguous messages critical of those who, they contend, 
exploit animals for profit.158  Some prominent animal welfare 
organizations appear to share this purpose, although they 
denounce violence and militant tactics.159  If organization 
members engage in the protest activities traditionally entitled to 
constitutional protection, such as boycotts, picketing, or 
leafleting,160 and that conduct is construed as “interference with” 
the property of an enterprise, AETA would implicate the First 
Amendment interests surrounding symbolic speech. 
The enterprises targeted by such activity often conduct 
research involving vivisection or animal experimentation, 
methodologies which a California Court of Appeals noted are 
 
156 § 43(a)(2)(A). 
157 § 43(a)(2). 
158 After break-ins or trespasses, typical messages left behind in the form of 
graffiti on walls and windows include “Animal Auschwitz” and “Meat is Murder.”  
DOJ REPORT, supra note 31, at 12 n.10. 
159 See EQUAL JUSTICE ALLIANCE, ANIMAL ENTERPRISE TERRORISM ACT 
(AETA) OPPOSITION LIST (2007), http://www.noaeta.com/AETAOppositionList 
.pdf (listing some 200 organizations including the ASPCA, Humane Society of the 
United States, National Lawyers Guild, and Natural Resources Defense Council). 
160 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909 (1982) (upholding 
boycott as a form of protected speech); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 
146–47 (1943) (upholding pamphleteering); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 
(1940) (upholding peaceful picketing). 
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“area[s] of widespread public concern and controversy.”161  In 
Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal 
Cruelty USA, Inc., a trespass and harassment suit against 
protestors of an animal testing laboratory and its employees, the 
court emphasized that commenting on matters of public concern 
is core political speech.162  Accordingly, “the viewpoint of animal 
rights activists contributes to the public debate.”163  Because 
AETA affects this protected expression, AETA must withstand 
the intermediate scrutiny applicable to content-neutral 
regulations under O’Brien’s balancing of interests test. 
AETA is likely to withstand this step in the analysis.  
Nonviolent advocates for animals may agree in principle with 
the militants of the ALF, who seek to influence behavior by 
affecting the economics of corporations “who profit from the 
misery and exploitation of animals.”164  But the notoriety of 
violent activism associated with the animal rights and 
environmental movements–like that associated with extremist 
opponents of abortion–increases the likelihood that courts will 
accept AETA’s facial neutrality and exclusion clause as 
vouchsafing protest speech.  While abortion-inspired violence 
has taken lives and animal rights-inspired violence has 
emphasized property damage, courts probably will find this a 
distinction without a difference.  The California Supreme Court, 
for example, has explained that actual or threatened violence 
can “play no part in the ‘marketplace of ideas.’”165  Regardless of 
its motivation, violence is coercion through unlawful conduct, 
not persuasion by expression.166  As Justice Rehnquist observed 
in his dissent in Smith v. Goguen, “[o]ne who burns down the 
factory of a company whose products he dislikes can expect his 
First Amendment defense to a consequent arson prosecution to 
 
161 Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, 
Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 536 (Cal. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005). 
162 Id. at 535–36 (citing Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 377 
(1997)). 
163 Id. at 536. 
164 ALF Credo, supra note 63. 
165 In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1373–74 (1995). 
166 Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 538. 
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be given short shrift by the courts.”167  The same reasoning 
probably will apply in consequent prosecutions under AETA.168 
The government’s interest in protecting individuals from fear 
of violence excludes both threatened and actual violence from 
First Amendment protection.169  Additionally, courts likely will 
find that AETA serves other important governmental interests.  
If maintaining access to reproductive health services170 and 
reducing disincentives for doctors to provide those services are 
important interests,171 for example, then protecting medical, 
research, and food production facilities–the first and fourth 
most targeted types of enterprises “victimized by animal rights 
extremists . . . during the 1977–June 1993 period”172–can be 
expected to survive intermediate scrutiny. 
C.  First Amendment Analysis:  Vagueness and Substantial 
Overbreadth 
Challenges to FACE included claims that it was both 
unconstitutionally vague and substantially overbroad.173  There 
was serious concern that ambiguity and potentially far-reaching 
enforcement would chill protected speech.174 
Commentators likewise argued that FACE could inhibit 
peaceful protests.175  FACE explicitly excluded “peaceful 
 
167 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 594 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
168 See generally Moore, supra note 24, at 270–71 (“If the Act focused on conduct 
rather than on a message, it would likely survive constitutional scrutiny even though 
a particular message may be regulated. . . . Without the ‘politically motivated’ 
language [in the model bill that became AETA], the statute has a much greater 
probability of withstanding constitutional scrutiny.”). 
169 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). 
170 Norton v. United States, 298 F.3d 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2002). 
171 See H. R. REP. NO. 103-306, at 3 (1993), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
699, 699–700. 
172 DOJ REPORT, supra note 31, at 11.  Protecting access to medical and food 
production facilities may be interests of sufficient importance to satisfy intermediate 
scrutiny, but it seems less clear that protecting access to fur retailers–the second 
most targeted type of enterprise–should support restricting activist speech. 
173 Campbell, supra note 102, at 977. 
174 Id. 
175 Angela Hubbell, Comment, ‘FACE’ing the First Amendment:  Application of 
RICO and the Clinic Entrances Act to Abortion Protestors, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 
1061, 1078 (1995) (citing Michael W. McConnell, Rule of Law:  Free Speech Outside 
Abortion Clinics, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 31, 1993, at A15). 
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picketing or other peaceful demonstration,”176 but left “peaceful” 
protest undefined.177  Given the Supreme Court’s recognition 
that because First Amendment “freedoms are delicate and 
vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society[,] [and 
that] [t]he threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as 
potently as the actual application of sanctions,”178 opponents 
appeared to have good grounds for challenging FACE.179 
Despite its potential chilling effects, however, FACE survived 
numerous attacks based on vagueness and overbreadth.180  The 
Sixth Circuit in Norton simply agreed with its sister circuits in 
upholding FACE against a vagueness challenge,181 and the 
court’s analysis of potential overbreadth took one short 
paragraph.182  Several elements of FACE compelled this 
determination. 
First, FACE prohibits only a limited range of conduct,183 none 
of which is constitutionally protected.  Second, FACE sets out 
prohibited conduct in plain language, much of it lifted from state 
and federal statutes that courts already have upheld against 
vagueness challenges.184  Finally, FACE expressly forbids any 
construction that would interfere with activity protected under 
the First Amendment.185 
These three elements, and even some of the same language, 
also are found in AETA.  AETA borrows FACE’s exclusion 
clause, trimming only a provision against construction that would 
interfere with state regulation of abortion.186  Thus, both statutes 
expressly disclaim interference with protected expressive 
conduct. 
 
176 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1) (2006). 
177 Hubbell, supra note 175, at 1078. 
178 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). 
179 See generally Michael Stokes Paulsen & Michael W. McConnell, The Doubtful 
Constitutionality of the Clinic Access Bill, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 261, 286–89 
(1994). 
180 Norton v. United States, 298 F.3d 547, 553 (6th Cir. 2002). 
181 Id. 
182 Id. at 553–54. 
183 Id. 
184 Campbell, supra note 102, at 978 (citing S. REP. NO. 103-117, at 22–23, 30 
(1993)). 
185 18 U.S.C. § 248(d)(1)–(2) (2006). 
186 See § 248(d)(4).  No similar provision appears in AETA to indicate that states 
wishing to provide greater restrictions on animal cruelty could do so. 
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Additionally, FACE and AETA employ much of the same 
plain language in describing their offenses.  FACE subjects to 
penalties anyone who “intentionally damages or destroys the 
property of a facility . . . because such facility provides 
reproductive health services.”187  Similarly, AETA permits the 
prosecution of anyone who “intentionally damages or causes the 
loss of any real or personal property . . . used by an animal 
enterprise.”188  A notable difference is that AETA lacks the kind 
of motive clause on which some defendants and commentators 
have challenged FACE as a content-based regulation.189  Courts 
have upheld such clauses as proper examples of filtering out 
conduct that Congress believes need not be covered by federal 
statute, ensuring that laws do not federalize “a slew of random 
crimes that might occur in the vicinity of” targeted conduct.190  
AETA declines to test judicial acceptance of motive clauses and 
likely eliminates the possibility of successful challenge on a 
motive theory by prohibiting intentional damage of animal 
enterprises, rather than, for example, prohibiting intentional 
damage of enterprises because such enterprises experiment with 
or upon, exhibit, sell, slaughter, or otherwise use animals.  
Finally, both FACE and AETA penalize the constitutionally 
unprotected use of threat or force to intimidate.191  Under these 
circumstances, AETA is unlikely to be struck down as vague or 
substantially overbroad. 
Just as FACE leaves undefined the term “peaceful protest,” 
AETA also fails to resolve the meaning of important terms.  As 
noted above, AETA neglects to specify the meaning of 
“interfere with.”  Additionally, AETA does not make clear what 
it means to “damage” an animal enterprise.  Such obscurity 
already has generated a profound chilling effect among animal 
rights advocates.192  A key reason is that AETA includes a 
 
187 § 248(a)(3). 
188 § 43(a)(2)(A). 
189 See, e.g., Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 683 (11th 
Cir. 2001); United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 922–23 (8th Cir. 1996); Hubbell, 
supra note 175, at 1076–77. 
190 Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d at 923.  See also, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 
487–88 (1993). 
191 §§ 43(a)(2)(B), 248(a)(2). 
192 Andrew Kohn, Editorial, The Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act:  A Positive for 
the Animal Rights Movement?, VT. J. ENVTL. L., Dec. 14, 2006, available at 
http://vjel.org/editorials/ED10055.html. 
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definition of “economic damage” in its penalty section.  There, 
AETA defines economic damage as: 
[T]he replacement costs of lost or damaged property or 
records, the costs of repeating an interrupted or invalidated 
experiment, the loss of profits, or increased costs, including 
losses and increased costs resulting from threats, acts or 
vandalism, property damage, trespass, harassment, or 
intimidation taken against a person or entity on account of that 
person’s or entity’s connection to, relationship with, or 
transactions with the animal enterprise.
193
 
Although the penalty section is not implicated until AETA’s 
offense elements–the intentional damage or loss of property or 
the placing in reasonable fear–are met, fear that causing an 
animal enterprise to lose profits might invoke AETA has spread 
rapidly among the animal rights community.  Given AETA’s use 
of the terrorist label and potential punishment of life 
imprisonment, assurances that reading such vagueness and 
substantial overbreadth into AETA is untenable can do little to 
dispel the chill.  Many animal rights and free speech advocates 
worry that organizing a boycott of factory-farmed eggs, picketing 
a circus, or visiting a website offering to send e-mails or faxes 
imploring a company to end its animal experimentation have 
become acts of terrorism.194  Moreover, while AETA’s exclusion 
clause ostensibly should have reduced the law’s disconcerting 
effect, the clause’s wording instead appears to have enhanced it.  
The clause excludes “peaceful picketing or other peaceful 
demonstration.”195  As explained above, however, if “interfering 
with” the property of an animal enterprise offends AETA, and 
such interference is accomplished through picketing or other 
forms of nonviolent–albeit disruptive–demonstration, then 
such protected speech would seem to fall outside AETA’s 
allowance for “peaceful” activity. 
 
193 § 43(d)(3) (emphasis added). 
194 See, e.g., Will Potter, Analysis of the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act:  Using 
“Terrorism” Rhetoric to Chill Free Speech and Protect Corporate Profits, 
GREENISTHENEWRED.COM, Oct. 10, 2006 (updated July 2007), at 2–5, 
http://www.greenisthenewred.com/wp-content/Images/aeta-analysis-109th.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2007). 
195 § 43(d)(1). 
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IV 
CHILLING EFFECTS OF THE FACE/AETA APPROACH 
A.  Discouraging Protest 
The threat of punishment chills.196  Utilitarians consider such 
deterrence a fundamental objective of criminal law when applied 
to conduct deemed outside social norms.197  A prohibition that 
inspires a fear of punishment for protected activity, however, 
creates a pernicious chilling effect.  Harvard Law School 
Professor Frederick Schauer described the consequences of this 
effect for protected speech:  “Deterred by the fear of 
punishment, some . . . refrain from saying or publishing that 
which they lawfully could, and indeed, should.”198  A law’s 
constitutional validity does not diminish the force of this 
effect.199 
AETA appears to create this chilling effect while avoiding 
vagueness, substantial overbreadth, or content-based 
discrimination, raising the question of whether fear that deters 
speech is simply an unfortunate side effect of a valid law.  One 
danger of side effects is that their consequences may turn out to 
be more severe than the maladies they purport to relieve.  These 
may include both individual and societal harms.200  The violent 
acts of protesters, of course, carry serious societal harms of their 
own, whether they are murders committed by militant 
antiabortionists or multimillion dollar fires set by militant animal 
protectionists.  This Comment does not defend those acts.201  It 
seems likely, however, that if both violent activists and 
nonviolent protesters “target” the same enterprises, then 
 
196 See Schauer, supra note 9, at 700–01. 
197 See JEREMY BENTHAM, Of the Principle of Utility, in AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1, 15–16 (J. H. Burns & H. L.A. 
Hart eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1970). 
198 Schauer, supra note 9, at 693. 
199 See Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808, 
814 (1969). 
200 See id. 
201 See generally 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 67 (1959).  As explained in 
Part II.B., the property destruction that AETA labels as terrorism presents a larger 
philosophical problem.  It is more difficult to argue that property crimes “so affect 
the activities of the state necessary to its preservation that the individual interest, 
even when put as a social interest in free belief and free speech may have to give 
way.”  Id. 
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members of the nonviolent group will feel that a law protecting 
those enterprises against the conduct of those in the violent 
group may nevertheless apply to them in some way.  Fear of 
association with the violent group is likely to inhibit nonviolent 
expression on the same subject.  Our society has a fundamental 
interest in avoiding such constraints,202 whether their effects are 
felt by associations or individuals.  Roscoe Pound described “the 
social interest in freedom of the individual will”203 as an interest 
deserving of protection or, at least, of careful consideration 
before any such constraints deemed unavoidable are applied: 
 If one will is to be subjected to the will of another through 
the force of politically organized society, it . . . is to be done 
upon some rational basis, which the person coerced, if 
reasonable, could appreciate.  It is to be done upon a reasoned 
weighing of the interests involved and a reasoned attempt to 
reconcile them or adjust them.
204
 
A seemingly rational response to this argument is that lawful 
protesters need not fear laws that do not apply to them.  FACE 
and AETA disclaim any intent to infringe expressive conduct 
protected under the First Amendment.205  AETA expressly 
excludes “lawful economic disruption (including a lawful 
boycott) that results from lawful . . . reaction to the disclosure of 
information about an animal enterprise” from its definition of 
economic damage for punishment purposes.206 
Assuming a mistake- and cost-free legal system, relying on a 
law’s express limitations would be a reasonable response.  But a 
protester who knows that AETA is inapplicable must consider 
the risk that a court may find the law apposite.207  Schauer 
explains that “[t]his possibility may be translated into . . . a fear 
that lawful conduct may nonetheless be punished because of the 
fallibility inherent in the legal process.”208 
But AETA likely would invoke fear even under a flawless 
adjudicative process in which innocence equaled acquittal.  An 
accused party still would pay the costs of defense, as well as 
 
202 See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982). 
203 POUND, supra note 201, at 318. 
204 Id. 
205 18 U.S.C. §§ 43(e)(1), 248(d)(1) (2006). 
206 § 43(d)(3)(b). 
207 See Schauer, supra note 9, at 694–95. 
208 Id. at 695. 
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mental and temporal tolls.  The legal process inevitably produces 
a chilling effect, which varies only to the degree a party is willing 
to bear the risk.209 
Attaching a stigmatic label heightens this intimidation.210  An 
accusation may taint a reputation with the suspicion of 
culpability even if charges or lawsuits ultimately are resolved 
favorably.  Imagine, for example, an unsuccessful defendant 
deemed a “sex offender” in a sexual harassment suit.  Even if 
not required to register in a database tracking convicted 
pedophiles and molesters, such a defendant likely would find the 
label a significant hardship.211  Protest groups well understand 
the communicative force of carefully applied identities.212 
Application of the terrorist label, and AETA’s authorization 
of increasing penalties based on economic damage, already have 
produced a pronounced chilling effect.  FACE imposed similar 
penalties on essentially the same crimes directed at abortion 
clinics and successfully reduced clinic attacks.213  Even without 
applying a stigmatizing label, however, FACE also shrank the 
numbers of antiabortion protesters willing to demonstrate at 
clinics or engage in nonviolent civil disobedience.214  FACE 
criminalized only unprotected conduct and expressly excluded 
 
209 See id. at 700–01. 
210 Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 504 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see 
also, e.g., Antonio J. Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 
834 (1990) (describing intimidating effect of racketeer label). 
211 The model bill that inspired AETA included just such a registration provision.  
It would have created a national registry in which “[a] person who is convicted of or 
pleads guilty to an act that violates any section of the Animal and Ecological 
Terrorism Act shall be registered with the Attorney General on a form prescribed 
by the Attorney General.”  ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 24.  The proposed 
registry would have required “the name, a current residence address, a recent 
photograph and signature of the offender . . . [and] written notice to the Attorney 
General regarding any change in name or residence address within thirty (30) days 
of making the change.”  Id.  ALEC’s proposed bill also directed the Attorney 
General to “create a website containing the information set forth in this paragraph 
for each person who is convicted or pleads guilty to a violation of this Act.”  Id.  
The offender’s personal information would have remained in the registry “for no 
less than three (3) years at which time the registrant may apply to the Attorney 
General for removal after a hearing on the application for removal.”  Id.  The 
enacted law did not include these provisions. 
212 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION:  THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 172 
(1990) (noting that Operation Rescue’s “carefully chosen name again illustrates the 
power that many ascribe to labels”). 
213 BAIRD-WINDLE & BADER, supra note 87, at 324. 
214 Id. 
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protected speech, but the law still decreased the desire to 
participate in legal protest.215  This is an example of the chilling 
effect’s force.  Those who would express their views must make 
difficult choices between nonexercise of fundamental rights and 
confrontation of fundamental fears.216 
Even so, FACE probably has chilled protest speech with less 
force than some opponents predicted.217  Uneven enforcement 
may be partly responsible.218  Between FACE’s enactment in 
May 1994 and September 1998, violence and intimidation at 
clinics remained high.219  Prosecutors, however, brought only 
forty-six cases under FACE during this time period.220  As clinic 
violence continued, abortion supporters attributed the apparent 
reluctant enforcement of FACE to the law’s conflict with the 
beliefs of some law enforcement officials.221 
If clinics lost some ability to control antiabortion extremists to 
reluctant prosecutors in FACE cases, however, they regained–
and increased–that control through the novel application of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(“RICO”)222 to antiabortion protesters.  In National 
Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler,223 NOW and two 
women’s health organizations sued abortion opponents, alleging 
a conspiracy to shut down abortion providers.224  Lower courts 
 
215 See, e.g., Ana Puga, Abortion Foes Meet Justice Department Aide, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Oct. 19, 1994, at 84; NAT’L LEGAL FOUND., FREEDOM OF ACCESS TO 
CLINIC ENTRANCES ACT (FACE), http://www.nlf.net/Resources/issues/face.html 
(last visited Jan. 25, 2007) (“This provision of the United States Code is being used 
to squelch legitimate political protest activity.”). 
216 See Schauer, supra note 9, at 693. 
217 See Gina Holland, Supreme Court Abortion Protest Case Worries Both Sides, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Dec. 5, 2002, at A10 (reporting statement of Joseph 
Scheidler (founder of Pro-Life Action Network, author of Closed:  99 Ways to Stop 
Abortion, and appellant in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 
discussed in this section) that abortion foes feared being found guilty of 
racketeering more than trespass or other less serious crimes). 
218 BAIRD-WINDLE & BADER, supra note 87, at 324–25. 
219 Id. at 325. 
220 Id. 
221 See Campbell, supra note 102, at 980; Robert Pear, Abortion Clinic Workers 
Say Law is Being Ignored, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1994, at A16. 
222 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006). 
223 765 F. Supp. 937 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff’d, 968 F.2d 612 (7th Cir. 1992), rev’d, 510 
U.S. 249 (1994). 
224 Id. at 938. 
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rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that donations to antiabortion 
protest groups were racketeering income received in pursuit of 
an economic purpose under RICO.225  Construing RICO to 
require a profit-making motive, both the U.S. District Court for 
the Northern District of Illinois and the Seventh Circuit found in 
favor of the protesters.226 
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed.227  Finding no 
economic motive requirement in the statute, the Court explained 
that an enterprise must have merely a detrimental influence on 
interstate commerce to warrant civil liability under RICO.228 
The Court’s decision sparked an explosion of commentary.229  
Some warned that branding protesters as “racketeers,” along 
with the possibility of liability for treble damages and crippling 
attorneys’ fees, would increase the chilling effect.230  Antiabortion 
protesters feared racketeering charges more than charges of 
trespassing or other less serious crimes.231 
RICO’s penalties, including the ability to compel forfeiture of 
assets, make it difficult to measure the independent chilling effect 
 
225 Hubbell, supra note 175, at 1064–65. 
226 NOW, 765 F. Supp. at 944; NOW, 968 F.2d at 630–31. 
227 NOW, 510 U.S. at 262. 
228 See id. at 256–58.  The Court specifically declined to address First Amendment 
implications of its holding, noting that although respondents and amici had argued 
that “application of RICO to antiabortion protesters could chill legitimate 
expression protected by the First Amendment[,] . . . the question presented for 
review asked simply whether the Court should create an unwritten requirement 
limiting RICO to cases where either the enterprise or racketeering activity has an 
overriding economic motive.”  Id. at 262 n.6. 
229 Jaime I. Roth, Comment, Reptiles in the Weeds:  Civil RICO vs. the First 
Amendment in the Animal Rights Debate, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 467, 479 (2002) 
(citing a number of articles). 
230 See, e.g., Brian J. Murray, Note, Protesters, Extortion, and Coercion:  
Preventing RICO from Chilling First Amendment Freedoms, 75 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 691, 744 (1999) (“[T]he stigmatic label of ‘racketeer’ affixes to anyone against 
whom a RICO claim is brought–even if that person’s First Amendment rights are 
ultimately vindicated.”). 
231 Holland, supra note 217; see Pro-Life Protestors No Longer Racketeers, Says 
Concerned Women for America, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Feb. 26, 2003 (“After years and 
years of litigation and the disgrace of being declared a racketeer, Joe Scheidler . . . 
has finally been vindicated.”) (statement of Sandy Rios, President, Concerned 
Women for America).  But see Campbell, supra note 102, at 961–62 (contending that 
potential application of civil RICO to abortion protestors had minimal effect on 
clinic violence). 
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of the deprecatory racketeer label.232  Anecdotal evidence, 
however, suggests that the label stifled political activism and 
contributed to a decline in political organizing in the antiabortion 
context.  Drafters of AETA’s model bill sought the ability to 
apply forfeiture to the aboveground animal welfare organizations 
that they accused of promoting ALF actions.233  The drafters’ 
success in achieving AETA’s passage increases the potential for 
application of RICO-like penalties to protestors at laboratories, 
circuses, and furriers. 
Animal enterprises already have employed such tactics 
aggressively and effectively to combat nonviolent protest 
activity.234  In Huntingdon Life Sciences, Inc. v. Rokke, for 
example, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia upheld a RICO claim against an activist who released 
video documentation of conditions in a vivisection facility to 
PETA.235  The activist, a PETA employee, got a job in the 
facility and began an eight-month undercover investigation of 
animal abuse.236  She brought her findings to PETA, which used 
them to publicize alleged abuse and to support an animal cruelty 
complaint filed with the U.S. Department of Agriculture.237  
During the activist’s surreptitious investigation, she received a 
salary from the facility.  She remained a PETA employee during 
her time in the facility and continued to earn a salary from that 
organization.  Huntingdon Life Sciences characterized PETA’s 
employment of the activist as part of a long-term pattern of 
 
232 See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) 
(“Argument is unnecessary to demonstrate that the appellation[] ‘damned 
racketeer’ . . . [is an] epithet[] likely to provoke the average person to retaliation.”). 
233 ALEC Press Release, supra note 12 (“One difficulty in using basic vandalism, 
trespassing, and destruction of property laws lies in the states’ inability to enter 
asset forfeiture proceedings.”). 
234 See Xavier Beltran, Note, Applying RICO to Eco-Activism:  Fanning the 
Radical Flames of Eco-Terror, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 281, 292–98 (2002); 
Press Release, Simon Ward, Fur Comm’n USA, Second RICO Suit Filed Against 
Fur Protesters (Aug. 8, 1999), http://www.furcommission.com/news/newsE54.htm 
(last visited Sept. 11, 2007). 
235 986 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Va. 1997). 
236 Id. at 984–85. 
237 Application of the RICO Law to Nonviolent Advocacy Groups:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 124–
26 (1998) [hereinafter RICO Hearing] (statement of Jeff Kerr, General Counsel, 
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals). 
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investment in racketeering activity.238  The court agreed.239  The 
lawsuit settled for an undisclosed amount, but Huntingdon had 
sought damages and legal fees of over $10 million.240 
The Supreme Court recently turned from an expansive view 
of civil RICO,241 pleasing a broad collection of supporters of 
First Amendment freedoms.242  AETA’s use of the terrorist label 
and punishments based on economic damages, however, 
threatens to repeat RICO’s chilling consequences.  The 
seemingly endless controversy surrounding the pursuit and 
punishments of terrorists suggests strongly that the stigma of 
potential prosecution as either a terrorist or terrorist conspirator 
will prove a more effective protest deterrent than prosecution as 
a racketeer.  Moreover, the anonymous, nonhierarchical nature 
of extremism in the environmental or animal rights contexts 
prevents concerned citizens who participate in peaceful protests, 
such as picketing at timber sales or leafleting in front of 
vivisection labs, from knowing whether they have entered 
inadvertently into association with violent extremists.243  If the 
risk of a civil RICO suit can make nonviolent protesters 
reluctant to speak out on politically unpopular subjects, then the 
risk of a charge of conspiring to commit terrorism may be 
significantly greater in our post–9/11 climate.244  If one fears the 
 
238 Rokke, 986 F. Supp. at 989. 
239 Id. at 990. 
240 See RICO Hearing, supra note 237, at 125–27. 
241 See NOW, 126 S. Ct. 1264 (2006), “a case involving nearly twenty years of 
litigation, including . . . three separate visits to the United States Supreme Court.”  
Autumn Nero, Note, Where Are We Now?  Clinic Protection in the Wake of 
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 21 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 73, 75 
(2006). 
242 See Daniel B. Kelly, Recent Development, Defining Extortion:  Rico, Hobbs, 
and Statutory Interpretation in Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 
123 S. Ct. 1057 (2003), 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 953, 954 n.5 (2003). (“[T]he 
American Civil Liberties Union, actor Martin Sheen, People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals, and even some organizations that support abortion rights 
have advocated lifting the threat of harsh penalties for pro-life demonstrators 
because a ruling against the protesters threatened their causes with harsh penalties 
for demonstrating.”). 
243 See Beltran, supra note 234, at 304. 
244 See, e.g., Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 86, 103 (D. 
D.C. 2003) (“The use of the privileged medium of a lawsuit to publicly label 
someone an accomplice of terrorists can cause incalculable reputational damage.  
Placing that person in a situation in which he must retain counsel and defend 
himself has dramatic economic consequences as well.”). 
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stigma of a criminal conviction over the threat of a civil penalty, 
one is likely to fear the charge of terrorism more than the charge 
of trespass. 
Both sides of contentious issues freely employ this heightened 
deterrent effect,245 applying “war against terrorism” rhetoric to 
everything from lawful protests246 to children’s movies.247  The 
danger to protected speech arises when such rhetoric becomes 
law.  Even though well intentioned, a law that characterizes the 
conduct of radical members of a broad ideological group cannot 
help but impute to mainstream members.248  Justice Black, in 
American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, described this 
consequence: 
[L]aws aimed at one . . . group, however rational these laws 
may be in their beginnings, generate hatreds and prejudices 
which rapidly spread beyond control.  Too often it is fear 
which inspires such passions, and nothing is more reckless or 
contagious.  In the resulting hysteria, popular indignation tars 
with the same brush all those who have ever been associated 
with any member of the group under attack or who hold a view 
which, though supported by revered Americans as essential to 
democracy, has been adopted by that group for its own 
purposes.
249
 
The reluctance of some sympathetic to the animal rights cause 
to participate in nonviolent protest for fear of conflation with 
 
245 Attorney Fay Clayton, who successfully obtained the nationwide injunction 
preventing antiabortion groups from interfering with women seeking abortions and 
other medical services from clinics that was recently overturned in NOW v. 
Scheidler, called the groups “an enterprise of terrorists that operates much like al-
Qaeda.”  Michele Keller, Latest NOW v. Scheidler Decision:  Violence and 
Intimidation at Women’s Clinics Not Protected Speech, 34 NAT’L NOW TIMES, Jun. 
30, 2002, at 5; cf. ALEC REPORT, supra note 25, at 9 (“[Animal Liberation Front] 
has an intriguing form of operation, much like that of al-Qaeda.”). 
246 Picketers who met regularly outside a Portland, Oregon, fur showroom 
prompted the storeowner to express his “hopes [that] anti-fur protestors will be 
prosecuted as terrorists under [AETA].”  Patton, supra note 2.  Nike CEO Philip H. 
Knight publicly condemned fair trade advocacy group Global Exchange for using 
what he called “terrorist tactics” in a national campaign of protest and publicity.  
RANDY SHAW, RECLAIMING AMERICA:  NIKE, CLEAN AIR, AND THE NEW 
NATIONAL ACTIVISM 41 (1999). 
247 Marc Morano, New Movie Called “Soft Core Eco-Terrorism” for Kids, 
CNSNEWS.COM, May 1, 2006, http://www.cnsnews.com/SpecialReports/archive/ 
200605/SPE20060501a.html. 
248 Susan Dente Ross, An Apologia to Radical Dissent and a Supreme Court Test 
to Protect It, 7 COMM. L. & POL’Y 401, 419–25 (2002). 
249 339 U.S. 382, 448–49 (1950). 
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violent extremists in the animal rights movement suggests that 
Justice Black’s observation is accurate.250 
B.  Reducing Economic Incentive to Invest in Social Welfare 
An easier justification for placing protected speech at risk 
might exist if AETA added any protections not already present 
in existing criminal law.251  AETA, however, merely criminalizes 
already prohibited conduct.  At the same time, AETA 
stigmatizes animal rights supporters as a class by branding a 
small subgroup–militant extremists–with a label appropriate 
for perhaps the most grave of modern criminal threats.252  The 
unstated justification driving this stigmatization appears to be the 
goal of reducing or eliminating economic burdens of responding 
to protesters.253 
A chilling effect on protest is likely to contribute positively to 
the bottom lines of formerly targeted enterprises, although one 
long-term consequence of a stigmatizing approach may be to 
drive some animal rights supporters toward violent forms of 
expression.254  One bottom-line benefit would be a reduction in 
the costs of security to respond to protesters.  The expenses of 
counter-publicity and legal fees also would likely abate, along 
with concerns of customers disturbed by protests.  When PETA 
distributed documentary videos of an animal testing facility, for 
example, a major customer of that enterprise withdrew its 
business.255  PETA General Counsel Jeff Kerr asserted before a 
 
250 See REGAN, supra note 61, at 191–92. 
251 See Marquis & Weiss, supra note 19 (questioning need for new law to combat 
special-interest extremism). 
252 National Security Threats Hearing, supra note 20, at 23–25 (describing al-
Qaeda and related groups). 
253 See generally Eddy, supra note 53, at 277–91 (criticizing protectionist 
approaches of State laws based on AETA’s model act). 
254 The well-established relationship between availability of nonviolent avenues 
for dissent and application of violence suggests that AETA risks exacerbating the 
problem it attempts to solve.  See Note, Safety Valve Closed:  The Removal of 
Nonviolent Outlets for Dissent and the Onset of Anti-Abortion Violence, 113 HARV. 
L. REV. 1210, 1221–25 (2000). 
255 RICO Hearing, supra note 237, at 130 (statement of Jeff Kerr, General 
Counsel, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, explaining that “[o]ne of the 
lab’s customers to whom we submitted our investigation results immediately 
suspended all testing with Huntingdon and conducted its own investigation, saying:  
‘The attitudes and behavior shown by lab technicians on the [PETA undercover 
investigation] tape are unacceptable to us.’”).  The behaviors documented on 
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House subcommittee that negative publicity prompted the 
facility to engage “the largest law firm in Boston” to file an 
eighty-page complaint against PETA.256  Kerr testified that, 
although the suit ended in an undisclosed settlement after six 
months of litigation, PETA’s documentary evidence helped 
bring about twenty-three counts of violations of the Animal 
Welfare Act against the facility.257 
Protests also can launch consumer boycotts that carry severe 
costs.258  The boycott of white merchants in Claiborne County, 
Mississippi, which gave rise to litigation that reached the 
Supreme Court in Claiborne Hardware Co.,259 provides one well-
known example.  Reviewing lower court findings in his 1982 
majority opinion, Justice Stevens described boycott-related 
business losses, including lost earnings and goodwill, as 
exceeding $900,000.260  Attorney’s fees for the resulting litigation 
brought the total cost to over $1.25 million.261 
The rhetoric used to describe protests often parallels that of 
some boycotts.262  The goals of protests and boycotts may relate 
as well.  The Court in Claiborne described these similarities, 
noting the Court’s holding in Thornhill v. Alabama that 
picketing with the express purpose of discouraging customers 
and thereby harming business sales was constitutionally 
 
videotape included Huntingdon employees screaming and shaking their fists in the 
faces of strapped-down primates.  Id. 
256 See id. at 130–31. 
257 Id. at 131. 
258 In one notable case, Danish dairy company Arla Foods Amba saw annual 
sales in the Middle East drop from $430 million to near zero in the backlash against 
Danish products that followed the appearance of caricatures of the prophet 
Muhammad in a Danish newspaper.  Richard Ettenson et al., Rethinking Consumer 
Boycotts, 47 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 6, 6 (Summer 2006). 
259 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 890 (1982). 
260 Id. at 893. 
261 Id. 
262 Compare Earth Liberation Front statement that “[t]he only way . . . to stop 
th[e] continued destruction of life is to . . . take the profit motive out of killing,” 
Brad Knickerbocker, Firebrands of ‘Ecoterrorism’ Set Sights on Urban Sprawl, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 6, 2003, at 1, with 1930s pamphlet calling for 
boycott of silk imported from fascist Japan stating that “[i]f your stockings are silk . . . 
they helped . . . murder thousands of babies and women, workmen, and peasants of 
China.”  Lawrence B. Glickman, As Business Ethics Fall, Consumer Activism Rises, 
BOSTON GLOBE, July 31, 2005, at F12. 
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protected.263  Open and vigorous efforts to increase public 
awareness of offensive business practices likewise receive First 
Amendment protection, as the Court in Organization for a Better 
Austin v. Keefe explained.264 
Prescient enterprises might avoid or reduce costs associated 
with countering such efforts by listening to the shouts of 
protesters when they call for business improvements that can 
benefit society.  Ignoring or suppressing protesting voices may 
remove a catalyst that serves to increase an enterprise’s drive to 
improve products, production methods, or working conditions, 
unnecessarily hindering social welfare and, ironically, increase 
the likelihood that business opportunities will pass unnoticed.  
Harvard Business School Professor and former Harvard Business 
Review editor Theodore Levitt described this “buggywhip 
industry” practice in his now-classic 1960 paper Marketing 
Myopia,265 discussing petroleum producers’ entrenched 
resistance to demands that they change course: 
[The oil industry] is trying to improve hydrocarbon fuels rather 
than to develop any fuels best suited to the needs of their 
users, whether or not made in different ways and with different 
raw materials from oil. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [C]ompanies that are working on exotic fuel substitutes 
which will eliminate the need for frequent refueling are 
heading directly into the outstretched arms of the irritated 
motorists.  They are riding a wave of inevitability, not because 
they are creating something which is technologically superior 
or more sophisticated, but because they are satisfying a 
powerful customer need.  They are also eliminating noxious 
odors and air pollution. 
 . . . For their own good the oil firms will have to destroy 
their own highly profitable assets.  No amount of wishful 
thinking can save them from the necessity of engaging in this 
form of “creative-destruction.”
266
 
 
263 Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 909 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 
U.S. 88, 89 (1940)). 
264 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). 
265 Proffesor Levitt’s paper sold some 850,000 reprints, placing it among the best-
selling Harvard Business Review articles of all time.  Louis Lavelle, Theodore Levitt 
Dead at 81, BUS. WEEK, June 29, 2006, available at http://www.businessweek.com/ 
print/bschools/content/jun2006/bs20060629_5211_bs001.htm. 
266 Theodore Levitt, Marketing Myopia, 53 HARV. BUS. REV. 26, 39, 44 (Sept.–
Oct. 1975). 
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Levitt’s reasoning indicates that encouraging rather than 
discouraging peaceful protest may produce quantifiable benefits 
for both society and business.  Although this Comment does not 
probe that theory extensively, the next Section proffers one 
prominent example as an indication that additional exploration 
might prove fruitful. 
C.  Decreasing Long-Term Competitiveness by Rationalizing 
Economic Protectionism 
Examining FACE and AETA under an economic lens reveals 
another similarity between the two laws.  Destructive, violent 
protests, whether they concern abortion or animal rights, have a 
negative cost impact on business.  They increase expenses, raise 
entry barriers, and decrease the number of competitors.267  These 
negative economic effects have prompted some commentators to 
suggest creative remedies beyond civil RICO, including applying 
the force of antitrust law to nonviolent protesters.268 
Businesses, however, also pay when laws intended to reduce 
the anticompetitive effects of illegal protests chill protected 
speech.  Costs take the form of opportunities missed and 
resources wasted on resisting calls for improvements that, once 
implemented, may provide positive returns.  Discouraging 
protest may foster, rather than prevent, damage to economic 
value. 
Oregon’s own Fortune 500 global sports and fitness company 
provides a notable example of a vigorous nonviolent protest that 
ultimately benefited both society and business.  Nike, Inc. 
initially responded to what became a storm of discontent over its 
overseas labor practices with strict denials and attacks on its 
critics.269  Founder and Chief Executive Officer Philip H. Knight 
directed his most aggressive responses toward fair trade 
advocates Global Exchange, condemning the group’s national 
campaign of protest and publicity as constituting “terrorist 
tactics.”270  Nike resisted taking responsibility for conditions in 
contract factories that fabricated its products, denied claims of 
 
267 Melanie K. Nelson, Comment, The Anticompetitive Effects of Anti-Abortion 
Protest, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 327, 349. 
268 See, e.g., id. at 356. 
269 See SHAW, supra note 246, at 24–25. 
270 Id. at 41. 
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abuse and exploitation, and refused calls for independent 
monitoring.271  Sales stumbled as negative publicity peaked.272  
Mr. Knight characterized himself as “the poster boy on 
globalization.”273 
The company’s evolving response suggests the folly of 
discouraging nonviolent protest.  Dropping the strategy of denial 
and activist suppression, Nike began to overcome the backlash 
and eventually took the industry-first step of disclosing the 
names and locations of its more than 700 contract factories.274  
Labor activists prize such information because it allows 
independent assessment of working conditions.275  Nike 
described its embrace of a more responsive strategy as learning 
“the hard way.”276 
Workers’ rights advocates who campaigned against the 
company’s practices grudgingly praised its steps toward 
correcting what they called “countless abuses that labor 
advocates have struggled to bring to light for years.”277  
Shareholder advocates too must have been pleased to see the 
quantifiable economic benefits that accompanied improvements 
of at least some degree in the working conditions in overseas 
footwear and apparel factories.  A leading socially responsible 
mutual fund, for example, considered Nike an acceptable 
 
271 See Rachel Stevenson, Business Analysis:  Global Brands Learn to Mind Gap 
in Public Mood on Ethical Trade, INDEP. (London), May 18, 2005, at 57. 
272 Special Report:  The Best & Worst Managers of the Year, BUS. WEEK, Jan. 10, 
2005, at 64 (“In early 2000 kids stopped craving the latest basketball sneaker.  
Nike’s image took a huge hit from its labor practices.  Sales slumped, and costs 
soared.”). 
273 Jeff Manning, Asian Labor Profits Nike, but Abuses Have a Price, 
BIRMINGHAM NEWS (Ala.), Nov. 26, 1997, at 1C. 
274 Rukmini Callimachi, Nike No Longer Sneaky About Factories, COURIER 
MAIL (Queensl.), April 14, 2005, at 28.  Nike eventually admitted to “countless 
abuses that labor advocates [had] struggled to bring to light for years.”  Educating 
for Justice, Victory–Nike Discloses Factory Locations!, http://www 
.educatingforjustice.org/stopnikesweatshops.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2007). 
275 Laura Smitherman, Nike Gets a Good Report Card:  Anti-Sweatshop 
Watchdogs Say Apparel Maker is Doing Better, BALT. SUN, Aug. 19, 2005, at 1E. 
276 Stevenson, supra note 271, at 57 (“[I]t has taken a long time to get to this 
point at Nike and we have made many mistakes.  For many years, we were defensive 
about it and saw it as just a PR problem.  Now we see it as part of the way we run 
our business.”) (quoting Nike Vice-President of Corporate Responsibility Hannah 
Jones). 
277 Educating for Justice, supra note 274. 
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investment after improvements were made.278  Nike began to 
consider its own corporate responsibility to be a performance 
enhancement, not merely a reputation protector.279 
As the Nike example indicates, nonviolent protest can 
catalyze business growth.  Violent forms of expression carry 
destructive consequences that compel their prohibition, but if 
targeting the violent discourages the nonviolent, the risk may be 
harm to the economic interests that protectionist statutes like 
AETA purport to safeguard. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Laws of general application are used to convict arsonists, 
thieves, murderers, trespassers, and vandals every day.  The 
special interests that some who commit these crimes share 
provide no insulation from prosecution.  Nor does the zealous 
commitment of extremists to causes that others advocate for with 
equal but nonviolent force indicate a need for particularized law 
enforcement tools.  General laws can protect against violent 
extremism without risking the stigmatization of the interests that 
militant activists support. 
The industry-specific protectionism that AETA provides, on 
the other hand, besmirches a whole movement by characterizing 
its fringe element in highly charged prejudicial terms.  As the 
example of FACE proves, merely criminalizing in express terms a 
specific application of ordinary criminal conduct can generate a 
chilling effect on related but innocent conduct.  Association of an 
inflammatory label such as “terrorism” with that process is likely 
to compound the chilling effect on protected protest speech.  
Indications of such augmentation are already apparent. 
Congress should recognize that statutory savings clauses 
provide little or no reassurance to mainstream activists for 
animal rights or any other issue.  Characterizing conduct under 
misapplied pejorative labels and coupling the characterization 
 
278 Smitherman, supra note 275, at 1E. 
279 Michael Skapinker, Nike Ushers In a New Age of Corporate Responsibility, 
FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 20, 2005, at 11 (“[T]he company sees business benefits 
from its new openness. . . . [T]he Nike Considered shoe range [is] an example.  
Designed in an attempt to meet consumer demand for a product containing fewer 
toxic chemicals, the shoe the company ended up making consumed less material 
and energy.”). 
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with harsh penalties practically ensure a chilling effect, however 
precise the regulation.  Justice Marshall, dissenting in Arnett v. 
Kennedy, pointed out that ultimate vindication “is of little 
consequence–for the value of a sword of Damocles is that it 
hangs–not that it drops.”280  Courts should treat AETA with the 
caution such an implement requires, distinguishing between 
protest activity and terrorism in unequivocal terms in their 
decisions on AETA and any future similar laws aimed at 
protecting other industries. 
Activists who commit crimes in support of their causes can 
neither hide from existing law nor find safe haven for their 
actions within the Constitution.  Justice Douglas made this clear 
in Samuels v. Mackell, emphasizing in his concurrence that “the 
use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not 
constitutionally masquerade under the guise of ‘advocacy.’”281  
AETA was not necessary to protect against such threats.  Its 
passage devalues critical commentary on the hardship of animals 
in experimentation, food production, product testing, and 
entertainment.  Society should hear these unpleasant but 
necessary expressions.  The Constitution safeguards them.  That 
fact makes AETA’s Damoclean sword a threat of considerably 
graver concern. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
280 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
281 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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